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By Wendy C. Gerzog
In its 2003 partnership return, Boltar claimed a
charitable deduction for a conservation easement
on property it owned in Lake County, Ind.1 The
company valued the easement at $3.245 million.2
The government reduced that figure to $42,000 in its
notice of final partnership administrative adjust-
ment (FPAA). The government also filed a pretrial
motion to exclude the taxpayer’s expert report and
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) and Daubert.3 The court ruled favorably on
the government’s motion and held that the amount
of the taxpayer’s deduction was limited to that
allowed in the FPAA.
At the end of 1996, Laura Lake Development Co.
LLC purchased two parcels (northern and southern
parcels) of approximately 10 acres each for $10,000
an acre. On October 1, 1999, it transferred those
parcels to Boltar.4 On November 8, 2002, Shirley
Heinz Land Trust Inc. (Land Trust) quitclaimed
approximately 10.3 acres (eastern parcel) just east of
the southern parcel to Boltar.5 At all relevant times,
the southern parcel was encumbered by a pipeline
utility easement. Also, as of December 29, 2003, the
date of the taxpayer’s donation, both the northern
and southern parcels were subject to an access (golf
cart) easement.
On December 29, 2003, the taxpayer granted a
conservation easement to the Land Trust on ap-
proximately eight acres of the eastern side of the
southern parcel. Of that easement, approximately
2.82 acres of the southern parcel (plus additional
land in the northern parcel as well as all the acreage
in the eastern parcel) is forested wetland under the
U.S. Corps of Army Engineers’ jurisdiction. The
discharge of fill material in those wetlands was
subject to permit application and mitigation for lost
resources.
On the donation date, both the northern and
southern parcels were zoned R-1 single-family resi-
dential use. The eastern parcel was zoned as a
planned unit development (PUD) and part of a
proposed, but not finalized, development project.
The taxpayer attached an appraisal report to its
2003 return. DeClark, managing director and prin-
cipal of Integra Realty Resources, and Meyers, a
senior real estate analyst for Integra, relying only on
a draft of the easement, prepared the taxpayer’s
report.6 The report stated that the ‘‘highest and best
use’’ of the burdened property was residential use
and determined values based on a 174-unit condo-
minium project. The appraisal incorrectly assumed
that the subject property was ‘‘under the jurisdic-
tion of the city of Hobart’’ and zoned as a PUD.7
Saying that the Integra valuation did not deter-
mine the value of the subject property both before
and after the easement burden, the government’s
expert valued the property at $42,000.8 Although
the government expert accepted that the highest
and best use of the property would be residential,
the taxpayer’s assumed use was unavailable until
the properties were developed. But, at that point,
the properties were landlocked, without access to a
public road.9
1See Boltar LLC v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 14, at 2-3 (2011),
Doc 2011-7257, 2011 TNT 66-10. Boltar LLC is incorporated in
Delaware and has its principal place of business in Colorado. Id.
2The taxpayer claimed a fair market value of $3.27 million for
the easement but reduced that amount by $25,000 based on
property value enhancement of Boltar’s adjacent properties. Id.
at 6.
3Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4The transfer was ‘‘in payment of a note and to prevent
foreclosure.’’ Boltar, 136 T.C. No. 14, at 3.
5Id.
6Id. at 6.
7Id. at 7.
8Id.
9Id. at 7-8.
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The court first described the statutory and regu-
latory requirements for charitable contributions, for
valuing contributions in-kind, and for a contribu-
tion of a partial interest in real property, especially
a contribution of a conservation easement in perpe-
tuity. Valuation for contributions in-kind is at fair
market value on the date of donation.10 For conser-
vation easements, the regulations require that FMV
be based on comparable sales prices, if readily
available. However, when there are insufficient
sales for ‘‘a meaningful or valid comparison,’’ the
regulations require that FMV of the easement gen-
erally be computed by taking the FMV of the
property without the easement and subtracting the
property’s value after the easement is granted.11
The court rejected the taxpayer’s own valuation
method because it did not explain in any intelligible
way why it was departing from the regulations’
requirements. By contrast, the government used
both a before- and after-easement valuation differ-
ence of $31,280, applying primarily comparable
sales.12
In its motion in limine, the government con-
tended that the taxpayer’s expert report ‘‘was nei-
ther reliable nor relevant.’’13 It did not contain
before- and after-easement property values, did not
value all the taxpayer’s contiguous parcels as the
regulations required, and the PUD was an impos-
sible use on the nine-acre burdened property.
The court held that the principles enunciated in
Daubert controlled the decision in Boltar.14 As the
government’s reply brief outlined, the taxpayer’s
expert report lacked consideration of ‘‘zoning re-
straints and density limitations and . . . pre-existing
conservation easements.’’15 The report ignored that
the PUD was inappropriate for the subject land and
disregarded that it ‘‘was not economically feasible
to construct and would not be legally permissible to
be built in the foreseeable future.’’16 In response, the
taxpayer maintained that Daubert was inapplicable
to a bench trial.
Also, the court held that FRE Rule 702 applied
both to bench and jury trials. The rule establishes
standards of reliability. Daubert emphasized the
need for the trial court to serve as a ‘‘gatekeeper’’ to
exclude unreliable evidence.17 Its gatekeeper func-
tion is used ‘‘to increase the efficiency of trials and
the objectivity of judgments.’’ Also, that function
should discourage the proliferation of an abusive
‘‘cottage industry of experts.’’18
The reason for excluding unreliable evidence is
the burden it places on the opposing party and on
the judicial process. ‘‘Expert opinions that disregard
relevant valuation or exaggerate value to incredible
levels are rejected.’’19 Despite the appraisers’ quali-
fications, in their zealousness and advocacy of their
client’s interests, experts can produce an unprofes-
sional report that ignores relevant facts. In that
instance, as here, the court must reject an absurd,
unreliable, and irrelevant expert opinion.20 In Boltar,
the court found that ‘‘the expert report is so far
beyond the realm of usefulness that administration
is inappropriate and exclusion serves salutary pur-
poses.’’21
The court determined that the taxpayer’s expert
report did not incorporate ‘‘realistic or objective
assumptions.’’22 Rather, the report applied erro-
neous factual premises and used an inappropriate
analysis. The taxpayer did not refute any of the
government’s objections, nor did it make any ‘‘ad-
justments or corrections to [the government’s] cal-
culations.’’23 Essentially, the court found that the
appraisers’ report ‘‘as a whole is too speculative
and unreliable to be useful.’’24 The factual errors in
the report ‘‘demonstrate the lack of sanity in their
result.’’25
The court granted the government’s motion and
excluded the taxpayer’s expert valuation report.
Lacking any credible evidence from the taxpayer,
the court was left with the government’s expert
valuation report and testimony26 and the burden of
proof on the taxpayer. Holding for the government,
the court sustained the government’s easement
value and deficiency assessed in the statutory no-
tice.27
Daubert
Daubert concerned litigation against a drug com-
pany that manufactured Bendectin by infants who
had allegedly suffered birth defects from their
mothers’ taking the drug. The case focused on the
standard for admissibility of scientific evidence and
10See reg. section 1.170A-1(c)(2), 1.170A-7(c).
11See reg. section 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
12Boltar at 11.
13Id. at 12.
14Id.
15Id. at 13.
16Id.
17Id. at 14.
18Id. at 16.
19Id. at 15.
20Id. at 15-16.
21Id. at 16.
22Id. at 17.
23Id. at 20-21.
24Id. at 21.
25Id. at 22.
26Although the government’s experts concluded that the
easement was worth less than the amount stated in the statutory
notice, the government did not ask to increase the taxpayer’s
deficiency. Id. at 24.
27Id.
COMMENTARY / ESTATE AND GIFT RAP
1424 TAX NOTES, September 26, 2011
(C
) Tax A
nalysts 2011. A
ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
whether the Frye28 test had been replaced by the
adoption of FRE Rule 702. The Frye test had re-
quired ‘‘general acceptance’’ in the scientific com-
munity to determine whether to admit new
scientific evidence at trial.29
The company had moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that Bendectin had not been shown
to cause human birth defects and that the peti-
tioners had not produced admissible evidence
showing the contrary.30 The petitioners responded
by producing testimony from eight reputable ex-
perts who had concluded that Bendectin could,
indeed, cause birth defects.31
In Daubert, the court agreed with the petitioners
that the Frye test was displaced by the FRE. ‘‘The
Rules occupy the field.’’32 Although the rules con-
trol, the court said, that change did not mean there
were no restrictions on the admissibility of evi-
dence.
Rule 702,33 which covers expert testimony, allows
the trial judge to screen evidence to ensure rel-
evance and reliability.34
The court explained the policy behind this rule:
Unlike an ordinary witness . . . an expert is
permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, in-
cluding those that are not based on firsthand
knowledge or observation. . . . Presumably,
this relaxation of the usual requirement of
firsthand knowledge . . . is premised on an as-
sumption that the expert’s opinion will have a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience
of his discipline.35
The court recognized that the trial judge’s gate-
keeper role might occasionally result in a jury’s
being uninformed about ‘‘authentic insights and
innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that
is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for
the particularized resolution of legal disputes.’’36
Essentially, the FRE give the trial judge the
charge of requiring ‘‘that an expert’s testimony rests
on both a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand.’’37
Conclusion
The court in Boltar, relying on the FRE and
Daubert, rejected what any reasonable reader would
consider to be an outrageously flawed expert re-
port. Sanity checks are always welcome.
28Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
29Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-586.
30Id. at 582.
31Id. at 583.
32Id. at 587.
33Rule 702, cited in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, provides: ‘‘If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.’’
34Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
35Id. at 592.
36Id. at 597.
37Id.
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